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Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court:
The Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision on February 20, 2009,
which is the decision sought to be reviewed.
There is no order respecting a rehearing.
On March 23, 2009 this Court issued an order granting an extension of time
within which to petition for certiorari to April 20, 2009.
There is no cross-petition for a writ of certiorari at the time of this filing.
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a)

viii

Controlling Provisions of Constitutions, Statutes, Ordinances, and
Regulations:
1.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54. Judgments; costs.

(a) Definition; form. "judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any
order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings,
the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments shall state
whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and,
unless otherwise directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by
reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more
than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default,
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It
may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the
justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side
as between or among themselves.
(2)Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or
exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a
ix

statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an
appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final
determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry
of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and
file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily
incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may,
within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the
bill of costs taxed by the court. A memorandum of costs served and filed after the
verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact
and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(c) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any
judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must,
within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for
that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.

Statement of the Case:
'This case is about a dispute over the purchase of real estate. On or about
September 26, 1997, Plaintiff Clark sold approximately eight (8) acres of land to
Defendant Archer through an Earnest Money and Real Estate Sales Agreement. (R.
at 48.) The intent of the parties was for Defendant Archer to develop the eight (8)
acres into a thirteen (13) lot subdivision. The purchase price of the parcel of ground
was Three-Hundred Sixty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($362,
700.00). (id.)
Plaintiff Clark conveyed the land by Warranty Deed on November 14, 1997.
(R. at 68.) The Warranty Deed was recorded on November 17, 1997. (Id.) Defendant
Archer was to make installment payments on the purchase price after the sale of each
of the lots. Defendant Archer's obligation to pay was secured through a Trust Deed
and a Trust Deed Note. (R at 70;72.) The total purchase price was due "on or before
April 27, 1998." (R. at 48.) Defendant Archer executed both the Trust Deed and
Note On November 14, 1997 and both documents were recorded on November 17,
1997. (R. at 70;72.)
Plaintiff Clark maintained ownership of the tracts of land neighboring the
parcel purchased by Defendant Archer. Due to drainage problems on Plaintiff Clark's
land among other interferences, Defendant Archer was unable to develop his parcel.
Without the development and sales of lots, Defendant Archer was unable to make the
installment payments as intended under the Trust Deed and Note.
1

On May 15, 2006, over eight years after all payments were due to Plaintiff Clark
under the Trust Deed and Note, Plaintiff Clark filed a complaint in the Second
Judicial District Court in the State of Utah. (R. at 1.) On September 8, 2006, the
Complaint was amended and alleged fifteen (15) causes of action against Defendant
Archer along with Bonneville Title Company, Inc., and Bonneville Exchange, LLC
(R. at 15.)
On April 26, 2007, Plaintiff Clark filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on his
Second Cause of Action (Quiet Title/Declaratory Relief Against Archer — Failure of
Delivery) and on his Ninth Cause of Action (Quiet Title/Declaratory Relief Against
Archer — Adverse Possession). (R. at 165.) Defendant Archer opposed the motion
and filed a countermotion for summary judgment on the same causes of action as the
statute of limitations had expired years prior to the filing of this action. (R. at 264.)
The Honorable Thomas L. Kay heard oral argument on the motion and cross
motion on September 24, 2007. Judge Kay denied each of the motions but invited
the parties to submit additional briefing on whether the "discovery rule" applied so as
to toll the statute of limitations. (R. at 354.) The parties each submitted additional
briefing on the "discovery rule." (R. at 362; 389.)
Plaintiff Clark exceeded the scope of the court's request, however, and briefed
an issue that had never before been presented to the court. (R. at 362.) Plaintiff Clark
claimed that an affidavit that had been attached to Defendant Archer's Cross Motion
for Summary Judgment (over three years after the statute of limitations had run),

acted as an acknowledgment of an existing debt under Utah Code Ann. §78B-2113(1)(b). (Id.) Judge Kay granted Plaintiff Clark's motion based on this new theory
under U.C.A. §78B-2-113(1)(b). judge Kay's oral ruling indicated that he would allow
for this issue to be appealed as an "interlocutory appeal."
On March 10, 2008, the court entered a "Final Judgment on Plaintiff's Second
Cause of Action." (R. at 456.) On March 31, 2008, a mere twenty-one days after
entry of the judgment, Defendant Archer filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal.
On April 15, 2008, Plaintiff Clark filed a one page Answer in Opposition to Petition
for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order arguing that, because the judgment
entered by the trial court was final, an "interlocutory appeal" was improper. On April
25, 2008, the Court of Appeals Denied Defendant Archer's petition for permission to
appeal. (R. at 483.) The Court of Appeals did not cite its reasons for denying the
petition.
On September 23, 2008, the parties again met in front of Judge Kay on Plaintiff
Clark's motion to dismiss the remaining causes of action. (R. at 682.) After oral
argument, and an agreement to cause the case to be ready for an appeal, Judge Kay
granted the motion and the remaining causes of action were dismissed on November
10, 2008 rendering all causes of action "final". (R. at 716.)
On November 24, 2008, Defendant Archer filed a Notice of Filing Appeal on
the entire matter resolved by the Second Judicial District Court to the Utah Supreme
Court. The matter was subsequently transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals.
3

Defendant Archer filed a Docketing Statement with the Court of Appeals on
December 15, 2008.
On January 12, 2009, the Court of Appeals requested that the parties respond
to a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition. The Court of Appeals directed the
parties to, in lieu of a brief, file a memorandum explaining why summary disposition
should, or should not, be granted by the court. The parties complied and on January
28, 2009, Defendant Archer filed his Response to the Sua Sponte Motion for
Summary Disposition arguing against Summary Disposition. (R. at 731.) On that
same day, Plaintiff Clark also filed his memorandum in support of Summary
Disposition.
The issue presented by the Court of Appeals through the sua sponte motion
regarded whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the matter. The Court
of Appeals indicated that the matter was being considered for summary disposition on
the basis that the Court lacked jurisdiction due to an "untimely" filed notice of appeal.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Defendant Archer was appealing the trial court's
ruling on the second cause of action, which order was entered and certified as final,
under Rule 54(b), on March 10, 2008. On February 20, 2009, after the parties entered
their memoranda regarding this matter, the Court dismissed the appeal due to a lack
of jurisdiction. (R. at 755.)
It is the decision of the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal for untimeliness
that is now under review by this Court.
4

Summary of the Arguments:
The Court of Appeals did not lack jurisdiction to consider Petitioner Archer's
appeal. Given the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Cedar Surgical Center vs. Bonelli, a
misdesignation of an appeal as interlocutory, as opposed to final, is harmless error.
96 P.3d 911, 914 (Utah 2004) (emphasis added). Archer's Petition for Permission to
Appeal an Interlocutory Order appropriately fulfilled all requirements set out under
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and properly put Clark on notice of
the appeal. The Petition was filed within the time limitations of Rule 4 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, Defendant Archer appropriately
complied with the notice requirements of the Appellate Rules.
Further, where a trial court improperly certifies an order as final, under Rule
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the clock does not begin to run for appeal
purposes. The clock does not begin to run on a party's time to file an appeal until the
judgment or order entered is final, as defined in Rule 54(b). The trial court, in this
case, failed to properly outline the finality of the order entered on the Second and
Ninth Causes of Action. The order that was entered did not meet the criteria
necessary to be designated as final. Therefore, Archer's time to file an appeal did not
begin to run until the entire case was resolved and Archer's appeal as of right was
timely filed.
Finally, Archer's interlocutory appeal maintained the consistent approach that
the trial court's ruling was improperly certified. This approach remains consistent
5

with this Court's adoption of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals approach to
reviewing Rule 54(b) certifications only on an interlocutory manner for propriety. By
filing an interlocutory appeal, Archer preserved judicial economy.
Argument on Question Presented:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT LACK JURISDICTION TO

CONSIDER PETITIONER ARCHER'S APPEAL.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure set out two separate appellate tracks
through which district court opinions may be heard on appeal. The first,
contemplated under Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, is the track for
an appeal as of right. Under this Rule, a litigant has the right to appeal "all final
orders and judgments." Rule 4 sets the timeline to which the litigant must adhere in
order to preserve the appeal. Under Rule 4, a litigant has 30 days from the date the
final judgment was entered by the trial court. In order to be appealable under Rule 3,
the judgment or order entered by the trial court must be final. A timely appeal of a
final order shall be heard as a matter of right.
The second track, contemplated under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, is the track set out for interlocutory appeals that may be heard according
to the discretion of the appellate court. Under Rule 5, a litigant seeks permission to
appeal a trial court's order or ruling that is not final. The appellate court is under no
obligation to hear the appeal, and the litigant has no right to be heard by the appellate
court. Rule 5 sets out the specific provision that
6

[al timely appeal from an order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, that the court determines is not final may, in the
discretion of the appellate court, be considered by the appellate court as
a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order.
Under this Rule, any order that is improperly certified as final under 54(b) is
improperly before an appellate court and is to be treated as merely seeking permission
of the appellate court to file an appeal of an interlocutory order.
Upon granting Plaintiff Clark's motion for summary judgment, the trial court issued
an order that had been proffered by Plaintiff Clark over Defendant Archer's
objections. The signed order purported to enter a "Final Judgment" and the trial
court included language necessary, such as "there was no just reason for delay" to
certify the judgment as a final adjudication on the Second Cause of Action.
Defendant Archer petitioned this Court to hear the appeal as an interlocutory appeal
as the trial court initially indicated. The petition was denied.
a. A petition for interlocutory appeal filed under Rule 5 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, fulfills the requirement of a notice of
appeal filed under Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

This Court has held that "any purported misdesignation of the appeal as
interlocutory, as opposed to direct, would be harmless." Cedar Surgery Center, LLC
v. Bonelli, 96 P.3d 911, 914 (Utah 2004). In Cedar Surgery Center, LLC, the Surgery

Center and the Bonellis had entered into a contract that contained a provision
compelling arbitration. When the Bonellis allegedly breached the agreement, the
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Surgery Center chose not to arbitrate and directly brought suit against the Bonellis.
The Bonellis chose not to answer the Complaint and the trial court entered default
judgment against the Bonellis. The Bonellis first appeared in the case by way of filing
a rule 60(b) motion for relief from default judgment and a motion to compel
arbitration based on the arbitration contract. See Utah R, Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The trial
court granted both motions on August 19, 2002. On September 9, 2002, the Surgery
Center filed a petition for interlocutory appeal. The Bonellis argued that the Court
lacked jurisdiction arguing that "when the district court ordered the parties to arbitrate
their dispute...the district court effectively 'ended the controversy between the
parties' in this jurisdiction, and thus entered, in essence, a final judgment. Cedar
Surgery Center, TIC, 96 P.3d at 913.
This Court did not decide whether the district court's order was final or not
because, "even assuming that the order was, in fact, a final order, this court would
nevertheless have jurisdiction pursuant to rule 3." Id. The Court reasoned that, under
the language of Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 'the timely filing of
the notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step' implicated under rule 3(a)." Id.
quoting Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, P19, 17 P.3d 1110 (emphasis original to
Cedar Surgery Center, TIC); cfl.GA Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward
H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3949.6 (1999) (noting federal courts have
reached the same conclusion with respect to similar rules under the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure). The Court found that, with its filing of the Petition for
8

Interlocutory Appeal, the Surgery Center timely complied with the jurisdictional
notice requirement of rule 3. The Court reasoned that, "[t]he object of a notice of
appeal is to advise the opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a specific
judgment in a particular case." Cedar Surgery Center, LLC 96 P.3d at 914, quoting

Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 128, 388 P.2d 798, 800 (1964);
Price v. W. Loan & Say. Co., 35 Utah 379, 385, 100 P. 677, 679 (1909). The Surgery
Center's filing of its Petition for Interlocutory Appeal effectively met all notice
requirements under Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and, accordingly,
this Court properly had jurisdiction over the appeal.
Similarly, as in Cedar Surgery Center, LLC, Defendant Archer filed his Petition
for Interlocutory Appeal within the time constraints of Rules 4 and 5 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This filing properly put Plaintiff Clark on notice that
the matter had been appealed. The fifteen (15) page "Petition for Permission to
Appeal Interlocutory Order" set out the parties taking the appeal, designated the
judgment or order appealed from, designated the court from which the appeal was
being sought and designated the court to which the appeal was taken. Accordingly,
the Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order fulfilled all of the
requirements of Rule 3 to put Plaintiff Clark on notice of the appeal. Defendant
Archer's purported misdesig,nation of the appeal as interlocutory, as opposed to
direct, would be harmless, just as this Court determined was the case in Cedar Surgery

Center, LLC
9

In denying Defendant Archer's appeal, the Court of Appeals relied on Lindsey
v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co., 59 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court of Appeals'
reliance on Lindsey, was dependant on the Court of Appeals' erroneous claim that
Defendant Archer had failed to file an appeal of the trial court's decision. The
entirety of the case law surrounding the point of law relied upon in Lindsey also rests
on the premise that the party seeking appeal at the end of the case had failed to file an
appeal of the order within the time frame allowed by Rule at the issuance of the trial
court's decision. In this case, however, Defendant Archer did file a timely appeal of
the decision. According to this Court's ruling in Cedar Surgical Center LLC,
Defendant Archer's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal was sufficient to preserve
Archer's appeal rights regardless of whether the 54(b) certification was proper.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not lack jurisdiction of the appeal as
filed on March 31, 2008 because Defendant Archer properly complied with Rule 3 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in filing his Petition for Interlocutory Appeal.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
Petitioner's appeal as a timely notice of appeal was filed.
b. Rule 54(b) certification does not start the clock running for purposes
of appeal if the certification is improper.

The federal appellate courts provide insight into the application of a Rule 54(b)
certification is improper at the trial court level. See First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d
298 (Utah 1991) (to the extent that the Federal Rules are similarly worded to the State
10

Rules, the Court will review federal authority in deciding issues surrounding the
Rules). A trial court's certification under Rule 54(b) is not conclusive as to the finality
of the trial court's order for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. McKinney v. Gannett
Co., Inc., 694 F.2d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Sussex Drug Products v,
Kanasco, Ltd., 920 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1990). If the order from which the
appeal is taken is in fact interlocutory and does not adjudicate one or more but fewer
than all claims in the action of one or more of the parties, a Rule 54(b) certification
does not permit an immediate appeal notwithstanding the trial court's erroneous
decision to treat the order as final. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1237 (7th
Cir. 1990), modified on other grounds, 952 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1992), reversed on
other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993).
In In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc., the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that, where an appellant did not contest a Rule 54(b) certified order until
the entire case had been resolved, the appellants had not missed their window to
appeal as the 54(b) certification was improper. 262 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2001). The
court determined that the district court's certification of its order as final was an abuse
of discretion and that appellants' appeal, which came well after the 30-day window to
appeal, was not untimely. Id. at 1107-8. The court held that "a district court's proper
certification of an order under Ride 54(b) ordinarily starts the clock running for
purposes of filing a notice of appeal." Id. at 1107. Where the certification is
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improper, then, the clock does not start running for purposes of filing a notice of
appeal.
Accordingly, Defendant Archer's appeal of the district court's Rule 54(b)
certification, was not untimely where the certification was improper.
i.

The district court's certification of the court's ruling on Plaintiff
Clark's Second and Ninth Causes of Action as final was
improper.

Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) allows a trial court to force an appellate court to hear an
interlocutory order. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Coman, 814 P.2d 1099,
1100 (Utah 1991). The Rule states:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether
as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Utah Supreme Court has delineated three criteria
necessary for a judgment to be certified under the Rule.
First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the
action. Second, the judgment appealed from must have been entered on
an order that would be appealable but for the fact that other claims or
parties remain in the action. Third, the trial court, in its discretion, must
make a determination that 'there is no just reason for delay' of the
appeal.
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984).

12

However, the Rule continues:
In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all
the parties.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54. Therefore, if the trial court does not make a certification on an
interlocutory order, or if that certification is improper, then the ruling is only subject
to review by the appellate courts on a petition for interlocutory appeal until the entire
case is resolved. Once the entire case is resolved, then the party seeking appeal may
seek an appeal as of right.
Although the trial court issued a certified "final" judgment, and used the Pate
language that there is "no just reason for delay" in its attempt to effectuate a "final"
judgment, this alone does not prevent this Court from reviewing the propriety of the
certification. In general, the cases wherein the trial court's certification under Rule
54(b) is reviewed focus on the second of the Pate criteria — whether the issue certified
is "appealable but for the fact that other claims or parties remain in the action." The
issue rests in the underlying premise that "interlocutory appeals should be avoided
because they present appellate courts with multiple appeals involving narrow issues
taken out of the context of the whole case which slow down the final determination
of the matter." Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1101.
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Rule 54(b) certification, then is reserved for those cases wherein the "degree of
factual overlap between the issues certified for appeal and the issues remaining in the
district court" is such that the issues certified for appeal can be found to be "separate
claims." Kennecott Corp., at 1100 (quoting Indiana Harbor Belt RR, Co. v.

American Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1445 (7th Cir. 1988)). "The initial question
of whether an order is eligible for certification under rule 54(b) ...is a question of law."

Kennecott Corp., 814 P.2d 1100. When reviewing questions of law, the Utah
appellate courts review the trial court's ruling "for correctness, giving no deference to
the ruling of the court below." R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., 100 P.3d 1159 (Utah 2004).
In this case, the degree of factual overlap between the issue certified for appeal,
Plaintiff Clark's Second Cause of Action (Failure of Delivery), and the remaining
causes of action was too great for certification to be proper. "When this factual
overlap is such that separate claims appear to be based on the same operative facts or
on the same operative facts with minor variations, they are held not to constitute
separate claims for rule 54(b) purposes." Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 69 P.3d 286, 289
(Utah Ct. App. 2003); see also FMA Leasing Co. v. Citizens Bank, 823 P.2d 1065,
1066 (Utah 1992). "Mt is inappropriate to place an emphasis on a variation of
specific facts needed to prove a claim ... while ignoring the factual overlap of the
,

overriding operative facts." Id. citing Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R., 932 P.2d 596 (Utah
1997).
14

Further, "a claim is not separate if a decision on claims remaining below would
moot the issues on appeal. Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137, 138 (Utah 1992).
The Court, in Bennion, went on to explain that a trial court's findings "should explain
the lack of factual overlap between the certified and remaining claims and thus satisfy
the Kennecott criterion for certification to be proper." Id. at 139.
In this case, the trial court failed to outline how the underlying facts of the
Second Cause of Action were'unrelated to the underlying facts on the remaining
causes of action. At the heart of this matter is the disputed ownership of a certain
tract of land and a clear violation of the statute of limitations on Plaintiff Clark's part.
The land was conveyed to Defendant Archer by warranty deed and, nearly ten years
after the land was deeded, Plaintiff Clark filed an action to foreclose on the land.
Each of the underlying causes of action rest on the same claim — ownership of the
disputed land and issues related to the recorded deed. Plaintiff Clark has sought to
prove ownership through fifteen (15) different legal theories, but all theories are
aimed at solving the single claim — ownership.
This case is nearly identical to the Utah Supreme Court case of Weiser 932 P.2d
596 (1997). In Weiser, the parties disputed ownership of a particular tract of land.
Weiser claimed ownership based on a land grant to a remote predecessor in the land
from President Ulysses S. Grant. Union Pacific Railroad's claim rested on a right of
way granted to its predecessor in interest, Utah Central Railroad. The trial court
determined that the grant under which Union Pacific claimed its interest was
15

conditioned on Utah Central Railroad filing with the Secretary of Interior "a map
approved by him 'exhibiting the line of said company, as the same has been located
and constructed' within three months of the grant" Id. at 597. The trial court found
that Utah Central Railroad had failed to meet this condition and ruled that Union
Pacific's claim of title to the land failed due to lack of condition. The trial court then
certified this ruling under Rule 54(b).
Upon review, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the Rule 54(b)
certification was improper. The Court reasoned
Here we have one claim--ownership of the disputed land--supported by
different legal theories. The trial court stated that the issue of the
validity of the land grant was a core dispositive issue, because a decision
in Union Pacific's favor would moot the other claims and render further
proceedings unnecessary. Therefore, there was "no just reason to delay
directing entry of final judgment." While it may be true that if we were to
find that Union Pacific prevails under the grant, Weiser's other
arguments would be irrelevant, the trial court failed to consider the
opposite case. If Union Pacific were to lose on appeal on the land-grant
issue, it could pursue its claim under one of the reserved theories of law
and/or equity, resulting in a piecemeal appeal. We held in Bennion v.
Pennoil Co., 826 P.2d 137, 138 (Utah 1992), that "a claim is not separate
if a decision on claims remaining below would moot the issues on
appeal." Here, a ruling that Union Pacific owns the disputed land under,
for example, adverse possession would moot the appeal now before us.
Thus, to hear this case in its present form would be to risk a waste of
judicial resources.
Td. Similarly, in this matter, there is but one claim, that of ownership of the disputed
land. While the failure of delivery claim is one theory under which Plaintiff Clark
claims ownership, there remain subsequent theories under which he could pursue his
ownership claim should he lose on appeal. As there remain subsequent causes of
16

action whereby Plaintiff Clark may regain ownership of the property, it was improper
for the trial court to certify this decision as "final" under Rule 54(b).
For instance, if Defendant Archer had pursued the Second Cause of Action on
appeal as certified, and had Plaintiff Clark lost on appeal (as Defendant Archer's
argument presented in the Docketing Statement demonstrates will almost assuredly
happen), Plaintiff Clark could have then pursued his claim for ownership of the
property under the theory of adverse possession. To pursue an appeal under a Rule
54(b) certification, then, would have resulted in a piecemeal appeal and a waste of
judicial resources. Therefore, the Rule 54(b) certification was improper and, after the
petition for interlocutory appeal was denied, the only proper manner to appeal the
ruling was to ensure the case was entirely resolved before seeking an appeal as of
right.
II.

DEFENDANT ARCHER'S INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

PRESERVED ARCHER'S RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE PROPRIETY
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION.

a. By Filing an Interlocutory Appeal, Defendant Archer Remained in
.

Accord with this Court's Reasoning for Adopting the Seventh
Circuit's Approach to 54(b) Certification and Appeal as of Right.

In Kennecott, the Court adopted the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals'
treatment of those trial court orders certified as final for immediate appeal. The
reasoning behind the adoption of the Seventh Circuit's approach over that of the
17

Second Circuit's approach was to allow the appellate courts the advantage of having
greater control over their dockets. 814 P.2d at 1104. The Court reasoned
A 54(b) certification has relatively little consequence for the trial court,
but it does force the appellate court to review a district court order
whether or not the appellate court thinks there was error and without
regard to the delays that may result from a piecemeal appeal. If fewer
orders are certifiable under 54(b), those seeking to appeal from
interlocutory orders will have to convince the appellate court that there
is good reason to permit the appeal under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate procedure, an entirely wholesome result.
Id. The trial court's certification under rule 54(b) of this matter was clearly erroneous
given the Court's decision in Weiser, as demonstrated above. Defendant Archer was
forced into the untenable position of appealing an improperly certified order. In lieu
of filing an appeal that was destined to be rejected due to the impropriety of the
certification, Defendant Archer petitioned the Court to have the matter reviewed
through an interlocutory appeal so as to avoid the piecemeal appeal that was to ensue
under the trial court's certification.
b. Defendant Archer's Approach Preserves Judicial Economy by
Limiting Appellate Courts' Initial Review to that of the Propriety of
the 54(b) Certification.

By seeking an interlocutory appeal, Defendant Archer maintained his position
that certification was improper, and pursued the only option available given the
Court's reasoning for adopting the Seventh Circuit Court's approach to rule 54(b)
certification. Otherwise, Defendant Archer would be forced to avail himself of a rule
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that he beleived to be inapplicable. Through pursuing the appeal of the trial court's
order as an interlocutory appeal, Defendant Archer placed the burden of defending
the trial court's certification on the prevailing party in the trial court. As the Court
stated in Kennecott, "Our experience suggests that district courts rather freely grant
certifications, often without examining closely the certifiability of the underlying
order." 814 P.2d at 1104. As Plaintiff Clark was able to file a memorandum in
opposition to Defendant Archer's petition for appeal, Clark was put in the position of
defending the trial court's certification as proper.
This approach limits the amount of effort required by all parties and the
appellate court in pursuing an appeal as final when an error in the certification of the
trial court's order may prove fatal. Otherwise, the parties and the appellate court
would waste time and efforts pursuing an appeal through preparing a docketing
statement, transmitting the record, and briefing the issues presented on an appeal that
is not properly before the appellate court. Defendant Archer pursued the matter
through a petition for interlocutory appeal so as to immediately present to the Court
the issue of whether the certification was proper. This was designed to avoid
pursuing an unsustainable appeal given the erroneous certification.

III. CONCLUSION
This Court has held that, where an appellant files a petition for interlocutory
appeal, that petition is sufficient to preserve the appellant's claims even where the
appeal should have been an appeal as of right. Archer's filing of a petition for
19

interlocutory appeal met all notice requirements listed under Rule 3 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, and satisfied the time requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, Archer's appeal was timely filed and
properly preserved his right to challenge the propriety of the trial court's certification
of its ruling on Plaintiff Clark's Second and Ninth Causes of Action as final.
Archer's time to file an appeal did not start to run upon the trial court's
certification as the certification was improper. The federal courts have held that an
improper certification does not cause the clocks to begin to run for purposes of
appeal. The trial court's certification was improper given that the Second Cause of
Action was merely one theory of recovery for the underlying claim of all causes of
action — that of ownership of the property. Under the Weiser decision, the
certification was improper and Archer's time to appeal as a matter of right did not
begin to run upon entry of this improper certification.
Defendant Archer's interlocutory appeal was the only tenable position he could
take. Otherwise, he would be forced into appealing the matter as if the certification
were proper while arguing that the certification was improper. A petition for
interlocutory appeal, however, allowed Archer to maintain his position that the
certification was improper while affording Plaintiff Clark the opportunity to defend
the trial court's certification. As district courts often certify matters without regard to
their certifiability, this approach forces the prevailing party into convincing the
appellate court that the certification was proper. This approach preserves judicial
20

economy and places the validity of the certification of a trial court's order at issue
immediately, instead of being reviewed after months of efforts are expended in
pursuing an appeal of an issue that is not properly before the appellate court.
Without the ability to review the trial court's improper Rule 54(b) certification,
Defendant Archer is without recourse. Instead of a denial of due process, Defendant
Archer has complied with the Rules of Appellate Procedure and should be given his
day to have the entirety of the trial court's decision reviewed.
For the reasons stated above, Archer respectfully requests that this Court hold
that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear Archer's appeal of this improper
certification. Further, Archer respectfully requests that the Court find that Archer
properly preserved his ability to challenge the propriety of the court's Rule 54(b)
certification.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of November 2009.

B. Ray Zoll,
Counsel for App ant/Defendant Archer
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of
Certiorari was served via U.S. mail, first class, postage pre-paid to the following:
Jeffrey S. Williams
68 S. Main St., 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Stephen F. Noel
Smith Knowles, PC
4723 Harrison Blvd. Ste 200
Ogden, UT 84403
This 13th day of November 2009
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23

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

y

us memorandum decision is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

FEB 2 0 2009

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
--oo0oo---James D. Clark, in his
capacity as Personal
Representative for the Estate
of Dale D. Clark,

)
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)
)
)
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)
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)
)
Mark B. Archer and Bonneville )
Superior Title, )
)
Defendants and Appellant. )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(For Official Publication)
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Second District, Layton Department, 060601640
The Honorable Thomas L. Kay
Attorneys: B. Ray Zoll and Micah R. Bruner, Sandy, for Appellant
Jeffery S. Williams and Jed K. Burton, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 Mark B. Archer appeals the trial court's grant of summary
judgment against him. This is before the court on its own motion
for summary disposition based on lack of jurisdiction due to an
untimely filed notice of appeal.
¶2 The trial court's order granting summary judgment to Dale D.
Clark on one of several claims in an amended complaint was
entered in March 2008. The order was certified as final pursuant
to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Archer did
not file a notice of appeal from that order but later filed his
notice of appeal after the remaining claims were dismissed in
November 2008.

¶3
Rule 54(b) provides that in a case with multiple claims or
parties, a trial court "may direct the entry of a final judgment

as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no
just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry
of judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The effect of such a
certification of an order as final is to make what would
otherwise be an interlocutory order appealable as a matter of
right. See Kennecott Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100
(Utah 1991). Appeals of right may be taken from "all final
orders and judgments." Utah R. App. P. 3(a). The notice of
appeal from a final order must be filed within thirty days after
the entry of the order appealed_ See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). If
an appeal is not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction over
the appeal. See Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,
1 7, 13 P.3d 616.
14 Archer challenges only the court's decision regarding the
summary judgment. That order was certified as final in March
2008. The appeal was not filed until November 2008, well beyond
the thirty-day time period in which to file an appeal from a
final order. Accordingly, the appeal was untimely filed and this
court lacks jurisdiction. See id.
15 Archer asserts that the summary judgment order was not
properly certified. However, he has waived that argument by
failing to timely file an appeal from the order. An order
certified under rule 54(b) must be timely appealed even to
challenge the propriety of the certification. See Lindsay v.
Beneficial Reinsurance Co., 59 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 1995). "A
rule 54(b) determination, right or wrong, starts the time for
appeal running. This avoids uncertainty for counsel about when
to appeal." Id. A rule 54(b) certification "does not give the
prospective appellant an election to appeal at that time or
later, when the entire case is over; such a judgment is 'final as
to the claims and parties within its scope, and could not be
reviewed as part of an appeal from a subsequent judgment.'" Id.'

1. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure address the situation
of an improperly certified order as well. If an order certified
as final under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
determined not to be properly certified, the appellate court may
consider the appeal to be a petition for interlocutory appeal,
but only if the appeal from the certified order is timely. See
Utah R. App. P. 5(a).

20081007-CA
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116 Accordingly, because the appeal was not timely filed, this
court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.
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Dismissed.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

4q:4
William A. Thorne Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge
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Ills'THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

(5-4ikil

----oo0oo-Dale D. Clark, an individual;
and Ruth E. Clark, an
individual,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs and Respondents, )

ORDER
Case No. 20080269-CA

)
)
)
Mark B. Archer, an individual; )
)
and Bonneville Superior Title
)
Company, Inc.,
)
)
Defendants and Petitioner.
)
v.

Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and McHugh.
This matter is before the court on a petition for
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to rule 5 f
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to
appeal is denied.:

(r day of April, 2008.
DATED this
this (
FOR THE COURT:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge
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Dated this April 25, 2008.
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Jeffery S. Williams (6054)
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HOLUNGWORTH & WILLIAMS
68 South Main Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Dale D. Clark and Ruth E. Clark

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DALE D. CLARK, an individual; and
RUTH E. CLARK, an individual,
Plaintiffs,

FINAL JUDGMENT
ON PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE
OF ACTION

VS.

MARK& ARCHER, < an individual;
BONNEVILLE SUPERIOR TITLE
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation d/b/a
BONNEVILLE TITLE`COMPANY; and
BONNEVILLE EXC b GE, LLC, a
purported limited liability company,

Judge Hon. Thomas L Kay
Civil No.: 060601640

Defendants.
Plaintiffs Dale D. Clark and Ruth E. Clark (collectively "Clark"), filed a motion for
summary judgment on their second cause of action. This motion sought declaratory and quiet
title relief in favor of Clark based on the failure of legal and effective delivery of a warranty deed

possessed by defendant Mark B. Archer ("Archer") to certain identified property at issue in this
case. The Court originally received oral argument on Clark's motion for summary judgment on

the second cause of action on September 24, 2007. On October 15, 2007, the Court issued a

Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment,. wherein the Court provisionally denied
Clark's motion for summary judgment due to a possible statute of limitations defense, but in
doing so, the Court indicated that it required additional briefing on that issue, viz, whether
Clark's second cause of action for failure of delivery had expired under any applicable statute of
limitation. In that regard, Archer had filed a cross motion for summary judgment asserting the
defense that Clark's second cause of action had indeed expired pursuant to the applicable statute
of limitation.
Supplemental briefs were submitted to the Court by the partici on the issue of whether
the Clark's failure of delivery claim remained timely and thus viable. With respect to that
supplemental briefing, the Court scheduled an additional hearing, which was held on January 28,
2008. After considering all of the briefing submitted by the parties, and further taking into
account the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby enters this final judgment granting summary
judgment in Clark's favor on the second cause of action of the amended complaint.
Accordingly, the Court hereby rules, orders, and declares as follows:
1.

Clark's motion for summary judgment on the second cause of action of the
amendedcomplaint ishereby GRANTED initsentirety.

2.

Archer's cross motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitation defense
in relationship to the second cause of action of the amended complaint is hereby
DENIED in its entirety.
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3.

The court finds that no issue of material fact precludes the entry of summary
judgment on the second cause of action of the amended complaint in favor of
Clark, and that Clark is further entitled to judgment as a matter of law as
mandated by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

4.

Utah law, like the law of other states, is clear. For a deed to be valid, and thus
capable of conveying title from a grantor to a grantee, it must be supported by
legal and effective delivery. "For a deed to be valid and legally enforceable, the
grantor must intentionally and knowingly deliver that deed to the grantee." divan

V. Lambeth, 351 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah 1960). Hence, a deed that is not supported
by such delivery, is of no legal consequence, and as such shall be invalidated by
the Court. An executed and recorded deed is presumed to be valid and supported
by legal delivery, but this presumption can be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. See Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 635 (Utah 1984).
5.

As a factual matter, Clark has overcome the presumption of validity accorded the
warranty deed that is possessed by Archer. As previously ruled by the Court:
Although closing (and thus the transfer of title) was _conditioned on the
payment of the purchase price as well as the approval of certain
development plans by Syracuse City, Archer was somehow able to gain
possession of a general warranty deed and record it in his favor.
Additionally, the escrow instructions pmvide that no documents, including
the warranty deed, were to be delivered to or recorded by Archer until
Bonneville title received the purchase price. Little evidence has been
presented to the court on how Archer came into possession of the warranty
deed. Clark, a man 96 years old, apparently cannot remember. Archer has
not offered an explanation. Given the failure of conditions, Clark now
alleges failure of delivery and, alternatively, adverse possession. * *
Clark steadfastly denies that he ever intended to deliver a deed to Archer.
"For a deed to be valid and legally enforceable, the grantor must
3
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intentionally and knowingly deliver that deed to the grantee." Givan v.
Lambeth, 351 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah 1960). The preceding rule is wellsettled, and Clark correctly asserts that Archer's deed could have been
invalidated on failure of delivery grounds. Indeed, Archer can point to no
piece of evidence which demonstrates a present intent to deliver a deed.
Although he notes that a letter written prior to the recording evidences an
intent to deliver the deed in the future, no evidence of present intent exists.
Despite the questionable nature of Archer's deed, Clark's instant action
may be barred by the statute of limitations.
(Ruling re cross S.J. Motions at 1- 2).
6.

All of the documentary and affidavit evidence submitted to the Court supports the
finding, as an undisputed fact, that no legal and effective delivery occurred with
respect to the warranty deed currently possessed by, and that was recorded in
favor of Archer regarding the subject property. Mr. Clark has stated that he never
intended to deliver the warranty deed to Archer and does not how or why it is that
Archer came into possession of the disputed warranty deed. "Thus, I have not
delivered, and never knowingly agreed to the delivery of that deed naming Mark
B. Archer as Grantee. To this day, I do not understand how or why that deed was
recorded in violation of the Escrow Instructions and the Contract." (Clark Aff'd
at ¶ 9).

7.

Moreover, critically, Archer's affidavit too supports the conclusion that he came
to possess the warranty deed under the "conditional" requirement to later obtain
development approvals for the subject property, and that Archer would then pay
for the property on a per lot basis once such development approvals were obtained
and the lots were sold. (See Archer Aff'd at ¶ 4-6, 10).

4
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8.

Thus, the "delivery" described by Archer does not constitute legal and effective
delivery as required by the law. "A deed will not be regarded as delivered while
anything remains to be done by the parties who propose to deliver it." See DenGar Enterprises v. Romero, 611 P.2d 1119, 1122 (N.M. 1980).

9.

All of the facts before the Court prove, as an undisputed factual conclusion, that
the warranty deed possessed by, and that was recorded in favor of Archer was not
supported by legal and effective delivery as required by law. The presumption of
validity has been overcome, and thus the Court hereby rules that the no legal and
effective delivery supports the warranty deed possessed by, and that was recorded
in favor of Archer.

10.

The second cause of action for failure of delivery remains timely and viable today
as well. The timeliness of this cause of action was the issue addressed by the
supplemental briefing of the parties as requested by the Court. The second cause
of action for failure of delivery remains timely based on the content of Archer's
Affidavit. Originally, the Court was focused on the principle or doctrine of the
discovery rule in relationship to the application of the statute of limitations to the
second cause of action of the amended complaint. However, the Court need not
rely upon or analyze the application of the discovery rule because of the content
of Archer's Affidavit.

11.

In paragraph 10 of his Affidavit, Archer testifies as follows:
Neither party intended that I pay $362,700.00 in cash to Clark the day of
the closing, prior to the transfer of the Warranty Deed. Rather it was the
intent that I not pay but on a lot release program. It simply does not make
5
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sense for me to not have the Warranty Deed prior to attempting to sell any
developed lots in the Syracuse Meadow Property. Otherwise, I would not
have been able to get financing for development to be able to sell the lots
when the property was in my name. Syracuse refused to allow me to
move forward due to the older, prior phase problems. I reached an oral
agreement with Clark wherein it was agreed that their written agreement
would be tolled until other phase problems were in compliance with
drainage through Phase 6 (which still is not complete) and interest would
be tolled as well with lots sold and payment released at $27,900.00 per lot
plus my efforts to assist would be deducted against the note amount of
$362,700.00.
(Archer Aff'd at ¶ 10).
12, Archer's testimony, as set forth above, renders the second cause of action timely
under the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44. Having agreed and represented to
the Court to the existence of a "tolling" understanding between the parties, Archer
is precluded under Utah statutory law and otherwise from claiming that Clark's
second cause of action for failure of delivery has now expired. Archer cannot, in
a sworn Affidavit submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion, claim
that a "tolling" agreement exists between the parties, but then assert, contrary to
that representation, that Clark's rights have nevertheless expired.
13. Based on the above, the Court hereby quiets title to the following described
property in favor of Dale D. Clark and Ruth E. Clark:
Part of the Northwest Quarter of Section 21, Township 4 North, Range 2
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point
which is North 89°40'58" West 343.49 feet and South 00°19'02" West
396.00 feet from the North Quarter corner of said Section 21; thence
South 89°43'54" East 700.00 feet; thence South 00°19'02" West 278.40
feet; thence South 89°40'58" East 39.53 feet; thence South 211.50 feet;
thence North 89°40'58" West 214.60 feet; thence North 88°37'08" West
60.02 feet; thence West 213.57 feet; thence South 73°57'58" West 215.52
6
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feet; thence North 211.39 feet; thence North 42°16'31" West 65.83 feet;
thence North 00°19'02" East 290.19 feet to the point of beginning.
14. The Court hereby further declares that the following warranty deed recorded in
favor of Mark B. Archer is of no legal consequence whatsoever: Entry No.
1561621 recorded in the office of the Davis County Recorder in Book 2235 at
Page 367 with Dale D. Clark and Ruth E. Clark as Grantor and Mark 13. Archer as
Grantee. This invalid warranty deed possessed by, and that was recorded in favor
of Archer shall be stricken from the public record, and is of no legal consequence
whatsoever.
15. Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court expressly
finds that no just reason exists to delay the entry of a final judgment in this case
and with respect to Clark's motion for summary judgment on the second cause of
action of the amended complaint. Thus, this judgment is a final judgment on the
second cause of action of the amended complaint in favor of Clark. The second
cause of action is the only claim of the amended complaint to address the legal
invalidity of Archer's warranty deed ab initio. In this regard, this claim stands
alone and factually separate from the remaining claims of the amended complaint.
Moreover, for this reason too, no just reason exists to delay the entry of this final
judgment in favor of Clark to quiet title to the subject property, particularly given
the advanced age of the plaintiffs.

7
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16. Having prevailed on its motion for summary judgment and the claim for quiet title
relie4 Clark is entitled to an award of costs, and this Final Judgment shall be
augmented to include the same. Based on a proper showing and as provided for
by applicable Utah procedure, Clark is awarded prevailing party costs in the
amount of

0 •

DATED this (*day of

ALV-4&.-

, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

,

Hon'. rable
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L. Kay
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68 South Main Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Dale D. Clark and Ruth E. Clark
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
0

DALE D. CLARK, an individual; and
RUTH E. CLARK, an individual,

FINAL JUDGMENT
ON PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE •
OF ACTION

Plaintiffs,
VS.

MARK R ARCHER, an individual;
BONNEVILLE SUPERIOR TITLE
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation d/b/a
BONNEVILLE TITLE COMPANY; and
BONNEVILLE EXCHANGE, LLC, a
purported limited liability company,

Judge Hon. Thomas L. Kay
Civil No.: 060601640

Defendants.
Plaintiffs Dale D. Clark and Ruth E. Clark (collectively "Clark"), filed a motion for
summary judgment on their second cause of action. This motion sought declaratory and quiet
title relief in favor of Clark based on the failure of legal and effective delivery of a warranty deed
possessed by defendant Mark B. Archer ("Archer") to certain identified property at issue in this
case. The Court originally received oral argument on Clark's motion for summary judgment on
the second cause of action on September 24, 2007. On October 15, 2007, the Court issued a
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Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, wherein the Court provisionally denied
Clark's motion for summary judgment due to a possible statute of limitations defense, but in
doing so, the Court indicated that it required additional briefing on that issue, viz, whether
Clark's second cause of action for failure of delivery had expired under any applicable statute of
limitation. In that regard, Archer had filed a cross motion for summary judgment asserting the
defense that Clark's second cause of action had indeed expired pursuant to the applicable statute
of limitation.
Supplemental briefs were submitted to the Court by the parties on the issue of whether
the Clark's failure of delivery claim remained timely and thus viable. With respect to that
supplemental briefing, the Court scheduled an additional hearing, which was held on January 28,
2008. After considering all of the briefing submitted by the parties, and further taking into
account the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby enters this final judgment granting summary
judgment in Clark's favor on the second cause of action of the amended complaint.
Accordingly, the Court hereby rules, orders, and declares as follows:
1.

Clark's motion for summary judgment on the second cause of action of the
amendedcomplaint is hereby GRANTED in its:entirety.

2.

Archer's cross motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitation defense
in relationship to the second cause of action of the amended complaint is hereby
DENIED in its entirety.

2
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3.

The court finds that no issue of material fact precludes the entry of summary
judgment on the second cause of action of the amended complaint in favor of
Clark, and that Clark is further entitled to judgment as a matter of law as
mandated by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

4.

Utah law, like the law of other states, is clear. For a deed to be valid, and thus
capable of conveying title from a grantor to a grantee, it must be supported by
legal and effective delivery. "For a deed to be valid and legally enforceable, the
grantor must intentionally and knowingly deliver that deed to the grantee." Givan
v. Lambeth, 351 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah 1960). Hence, a deed that is not supported
by such delivery, is of no legal consequence, and as such shall be invalidated by
the Court. An executed and recorded deed is presumed to be valid and supported
by legal delivery, but this presumption can be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. See Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 635 (Utah 1984).

5.

As a factual matter, Clark has overcome the presumption of validity accorded the
warranty deed that is possessed by Archer. As previously ruled by the Court:
Although closing (and ,thus the =transfer of title) was conditioned on the
payment of the purchase price as well as the approval of certain
development plans by Syracuse City, Archer was somehow =able to gain
possession of a general warranty deed and record it in his favor.
Additionally, the escrow instructions provide that no documents, including
the warranty deed, were to be delivered to or recorded by Archer until
Bonneville title received the purchase price. Little evidence has been
presented to the court on how Archer came into possession of the warranty
deed. Clark, a man 96 years old, apparently cannot remember. Archer has
not offered an explanation. Given the failure of conditions, Clark now
alleges failure of delivery and, alternatively, adverse possession. * *
Clark steadfastly denies that he ever intended to deliver a deed to Archer.
"For a deed to be valid and legally enforceable, the grantor must
3
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intentionally and knowingly deliver that deed to the grantee." Givan v.
Lambeth, 351 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah 1960). The preceding rule is wellsettled, and Clark correctly asserts that Archer's deed could have been
invalidated on failure of delivery grounds. Indeed, Archer can point to no
piece of evidence which demonstrates a present intent to deliver a deed.
Although he notes that a letter written prior to the recording evidences an
intent to deliver the deed in the future, no evidence of present intent exists.
Despite the questionable nature of Archer's deed, Clark's instant action
may be barred by the statute of limitations.
(Ruling re cross S.J. Motions at 1- 2).
6.

All of the documentary and affidavit evidence submitted to the Court supports the
finding, as an undisputed fact, that no legal and effective delivery occurred with
respect to the warranty deed currently possessed by, and that was recorded in
favor of Archer regarding the subject property. Mr. Clark has stated that he never
intended to deliver the warranty deed to Archer and does not how or why it is that
Archer came into possession of the disputed warranty deed. "Thus, I have not
delivered, and never knowingly agreed to the delivery of that deed naming Mark
B. Archer as Grantee. To this day, I do not understand how or why that deed was
recorded in violation of the Escrow Instructions and the Contract." (Clark Aff'd
at I 9).

7.

Moreover, critically, Archer's affidavit too supports the conclusion that he came
to possess the warranty deed under the "conditional" requirement to later obtain
development approvals for the subject property, and that Archer would then pay
for the property on a per lot basis once such development approvals were obtained
and the lots were sold. (See Archer Afrd at ri 4-6,10).
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8.

Thus, the "delivery" described by Archer does not constitute legal and effective
delivery as required by the law. "A deed will not be regarded as delivered while
anything remains to be done by the parties who propose to deliver it." See DenGar Enterprises v. Romero, 611 P.2d 1119, 1122 (N.M. 1980).

9.

All of the facts before the Court prove, as an undisputed factual conclusion, that
the warranty deed possessed by, and that was recorded in favor of Archer was not
supported by legal and effective delivery as required by law. The presumption of
validity has been overcome, and thus the Court hereby rules that the no legal and
effective delivery supports the warranty deed possessed by, and that was recorded
in favor of Archer.

10.

The second cause of action for failure of delivery remains timely and viable today
as well. The timeliness of this cause of action was the issue addressed by the
supplemental briefing of the parties as requested by the Court. The second cause
of action for failure of delivery remains timely based on the content of Archer's
Affidavit. Originally, the Court was focused on the principle or doctrine of the
discovery rule in relationship to the application of the statute of limitations to the
second cause of action of the amended complaint. However, the Court need not
rely upon or analyze the application of the discovery rule because of the content
of Archer's Affidavit.

11.

In paragraph 10 of his Affidavit, Archer testifies as follows:
Neither party intended that I pay $362,700.00 in cash to Clark the day of
the closing, prior to the transfer of the Warranty Deed. Rather it was the
intent that I not pay but on a lot release program. It simply does not make
5
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sense for me to not have the Warranty Deed prior to attempting to sell any
developed lots in the Syracuse Meadow Property. Otherwise, I would not
have been able to get financing for development to be able to sell the lots
when the property was in my name. Syracuse refused to allow me to
move forward due to the older, prior phase problems. I reached an oral
agreement with Clark wherein it was agreed that their written agreement
would be tolled until other phase problems were in compliance with
drainage through Phase 6 (which still is not complete) and interest would
be tolled as well with lots sold and payment released at $27,900.00 per lot
plus my efforts to assist would be deducted against the note amount of
$362,700.00.
(Archer Aff'd at ¶ 10).
12. Archer's testimony, as set forth above, renders the second cause of action timely
under the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44. Having agreed and represented to
the Court to the existence of a "tolling" understanding between the parties, Archer
is precluded under Utah statutory law and otherwise from claiming that Clark's
second cause of action for failure of delivery has now expired. Archer cannot, in
a sworn Affidavit submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion, claim
that a "tolling" agreement exists between the parties, but then assert, contrary to
that representation, that Clark's rights have nevertheless expired.
13. Based on the above, the Court hereby quiets title to the following described
property in favor of Dale D. Clark and Ruth E. Clark:
Part of the Northwest Quarter of Section 21, Township 4 North, Range 2
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point
which is North 89°40'58" West 343.49 feet and South 00°19'02" West
396.00 feet from the North Quarter corner of said Section 21; thence
South 89°43'54" East 700.00 feet; thence South 00°19'02" West 278.40
feet; thence South 89°40'58" East 39.53 feet; thence South 211.50 feet;
thence North 89°40'58" West 214.60 feet; thence North 88°37'08" West
60.02 feet; thence West 213.57 feet; thence South 73°57'58" West 215.52
6
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feet; thence North 21139 feet; thence North 42°16'31" West 65.83 feet;
thence North 00°19'02" East 290.19 feet to the point of beginning.
14.

The Court hereby further declares that the following warranty

deed recorded in

favor of Mark B. Archer is of no legal consequence whatsoever: Entry No.
1561621 recorded in the office of the Davis County Recorder in Book 2235 at
Page 367 with Dale D. Clark and Ruth E. Clark as Grantor and Mark B. Archer as
Grantee. This invalid warranty deed possessed by, and that was recorded in favor
of Archer shall be stricken from the public record, and is of no legal consequence
whatsoever.
15.

Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court expressly
finds that no just reason exists to delay the entry of a final judgment in this case
and with respect to Clark's motion for summary judgment on the second cause of
action of the amended complaint. Thus, this judgment is a final judgment on the
second cause of action of the amended complaint in favor of Clark. The second
cause of action is the only claim of the amended complaint to address the legal
invalidity of Archer's warranty deed ab initio. In this regard, this claim stands
alone and factually separate from the remaining claims of the amended complaint.
Moreover, for this reason too, no just reason exists to delay the entry of this final
judgment in favor of Clark to quiet title to the subject property, particularly given
the advanced age of the plaintiffs.
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16. Having prevailed on its motion for summary judgment and the claim for quiet title
relief, Clark is entitled to an award of costs, and this Final Judgment shall be
augmented to include the same. Based on a proper showing and as provided for
by applicable Utah procedure, Clark is awarded prevailing party costs in the
amount of

0

DATED this P4,_41ay
1
of

141J4`k-'

, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

STATE Y-1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT ON
PLAINTIFFS' SEC 0 0 CAUSE OF ACTION was served via U.S. first-class mail, postage

prepaid, thisada ebruary, 2008, upon:
B. Ray Zoll
B.RAY ZOLL, P.C.
8941 South 700 East, Suite 204
Sandy, Utah 84070
Stephen F. Noel
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C.

4723 Harrison Blvd. Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84403
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